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Abstract—Coordinating the operation of units at the interface
between heat and electricity systems, such as combined heat and
power plants and heat pumps, is essential to reduce inefficiencies
in each system and help achieve a cost-effective and efficient
operation of the overall energy system. These energy systems are
currently operated by sequential markets, which interface the
technical and economic aspects of the systems. In that context,
this study introduces an electricity-aware heat unit commitment
model, which seeks to optimize the operation of the heat system
while accounting for the techno-economic interdependencies be-
tween heat and electricity markets. These interdependencies are
represented by bid-validity constraints, which model the linkage
between the heat and electricity outputs and costs of combined
heat and power plants and heat pumps. This approach also
constitutes a novel market mechanism for the coordination of
heat and electricity systems, which defines heat bids conditionally
on electricity prices. Additionally, a tractable reformulation of the
resulting trilevel optimization problem as a mixed integer linear
program is proposed. Finally, it is shown on a case study that
the proposed model yields a 23% reduction in total operating
cost and a 6% reduction in wind curtailment compared to a
traditional decoupled unit commitment model.
Index Terms—Bid validity, Hierarchical optimization, Market
mechanism, Multi-energy systems, Unit commitment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Exploiting the synergies between the power system and
other energy systems has been identified as a key component
to achieve a flexible and sustainable energy future [1], [2],
[3]. In particular, due to its strong technical and economic
interdependencies with the power system, an energy efficient
and integrated heat system is central in a sustainable energy
system [4], [5], [6]. However, in many countries, such as
Denmark, heat and electricity systems are operated by energy
markets, which interface the technical and economic aspects of
each system sequentially and independently. In that context,
as highlighted in [7], the heat-driven dispatch of combined
heat and power (CHP) plants and heat pumps may limit their
flexibility in the electricity market and hinder the penetration
of renewable energy sources. Additionally, [8] showed that
in Nordic countries the heat-driven dispatch of CHPs in the
heat market may increase their market power in the electricity
system and impact electricity prices. In turn, electricity prices
impact the merit order in the heat market and the profitability
of CHPs. These challenges raise an important research ques-
tion: how to coordinate the operation of CHPs and heat pumps
at the interface between heat and electricity systems, in order
to achieve a cost-effective and efficient operation of the overall
energy system in the current market environment?
From an operational point of view, this question has been
tackled extensively in the literature with fully integrated
approaches. Reference [7] proposed a combined economic
dispatch for heat and electricity systems, which increases the
flexibility of CHPs at the interface between both systems.
In addition, [9], [10], [11], [12] provided models of the
dynamics of heat transfer in the district heating network that
utilize the energy storage capacity of pipelines. These studies
showed the benefits of accurately representing the techno-
economic characteristics of the district heating system, in
order to achieve an optimal operation of the overall energy
system. However, these approaches do not respect the current
sequential and independent organization of heat and electricity
markets.
By opposition with these fully integrated operational ap-
proaches, [13] introduced a novel formulation of the heat
market-clearing problem. This approach provided a soft coor-
dination between heat and electricity systems while respecting
the sequential clearing of their respective markets. This coor-
dination is achieved by modeling the heat market clearing as
a bilevel optimization problem, which seeks to minimize the
heat dispatch cost in the upper level, while anticipating the
impact of heat dispatch on the electricity market clearing in
the lower level. Similarly, [14] introduced the concept of bid
validity for coordinating the participation of gas-fired power
plants (GFPP) in the sequential electricity and natural gas
markets. This novel market mechanism enforces the validity of
the bids of GFPPs in a gas-aware unit commitment problem,
modeled as a trilevel optimization problem. However, the
main limitation of these approaches is their computational
tractability, due to the non-convex complementarity conditions
on the lower-level problems, which limits their applicability
in large-scale energy systems. Additionally, although energy
markets should interface the technical and economic aspects
of each energy system, the economic dispatch in [13] does
not account for the the non-convex temperature dynamics in
district heating networks, and the complex techno-economic
characteristics of heat and electricity producers, such as start-
up and no-load costs, and minimum on/off times. The decou-
pling of these operational and economic aspects may result
in an inefficient or even infeasible dispatch. In order to
address these challenges, [14] proposed a convex relaxation
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of the complex dynamics in natural gas networks, and a
tractable reformulation of the proposed trilevel optimization
problem using a lexicographic function and strong duality of
the middle- and lower-level problems.
In view of the state-of-the-art presented above, a gap re-
mains in the literature to interface and coordinate the technical
and economic aspects of both heat and electricity systems
in the current market environment. Non-convex heat transfer
dynamics can be accounted for in energy markets using a
convex relaxation approach, as proposed in [11]. However,
unit commitment (UC) decisions introduce pricing challenges
in energy markets and result uplift payments [15], [16]. The
commitment and dispatch decisions are traditionally fixed
separately in European energy markets. In that context, in
order to accurately represent the techno-economic interde-
pendencies between heat and electricity systems and improve
the coordination between them, the heat UC problem should
anticipate the impact of the commitment of CHPs and heat
pumps on both heat and electricity market-clearing problems.
As a result, the contributions of this paper are threefold. Firstly,
an electricity-aware heat UC model, formulated as a trilevel
optimization problem, is proposed. In the upper level, the heat
UC problem seeks to minimize the heat system operating cost,
while anticipating the heat and electricity market clearings
in the middle- and lower-level problems through bid-validity
constraints. By opposition with fully integrated coordination
approaches introduced in the literature, the proposed approach
induces a soft-coordination between heat and electricity sys-
tems while respecting the sequential order of their UC and
market clearing. Secondly, this trilevel optimization problem
is reformulated as a tractable single-level mixed integer linear
program (MILP) using a lexicographic function and strong
duality of the middle- and lower-level problems. Finally,
the proposed heat UC model is compared to a traditional
sequential and decoupled UC model, using an IEEE 24-bus
power system and 6-node district heating system. This analysis
provides the basis to quantify the value of improving the
coordination between heat and electricity systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the techno-economic interdependencies between
heat and electricity systems, Section III introduces the pro-
posed electricity-aware heat UC model, Section IV presents
numerical results, and Section V concludes and discusses
potential extensions of this work. The extended formulations
are provided in the online appendix [17].
II. TECHNO-ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCIES BETWEEN
HEAT AND ELECTRICITY SYSTEMS
A. Techno-economic characteristics of CHPs and heat pumps
The strong linkage between the heat and electricity outputs
of CHPs and heat pumps are at the interface between heat
and electricity systems creates implicit interdependencies in
the operation of both systems. Indeed, the heat and electricity
outputs, Qjt and Pjt, of CHPs j ∈ IHP at a given time period
t ∈ T are constrained by their joint Feasible Operating Region
(FOR) [18]. The majority of CHPs are extraction units that can
produce heat and electricity at different ratios. Their FOR can
be modeled by a set of linear equations, which links their heat
and electricity outputs as follows:
Pjt ≥ rjQjt, ∀j ∈ ICHP, t ∈ T (1a)
u0jtF j ≤ ρHjQjt + ρEjPjt ≤ u0jtF j , ∀j ∈ ICHP, t ∈ T (1b)
where (1a) introduces the minimum heat to power ratio rj ,
and (1b) the upper and lower bounds F j and F j , on the
fuel consumption Fjt = ρEjPjt + ρ
H
jQjt. Besides, ρ
E
j and ρ
H
j
represent the electricity and heat efficiency, respectively, and
u0jt ∈ {0, 1} the on/off state of the CHP. Additionally, the
heat output Qjt of heat pumps j ∈ IHP is proportional to
their electricity consumption LHPjt , with a fixed heat-to-power
ratio represented by their coefficient of performance COPj ,
such that
Qjt = COPjLHPjt , ∀j ∈ IHP, t ∈ T . (2a)
In addition to the aforementioned physical interdependen-
cies, the production costs of CHPs and heat pumps are
intrinsically linked to their heat and electricity outputs. Indeed,
as heat pumps produce heat from electricity purchased in the
electricity market, their variable heat production cost Γjt is
proportional to their electricity consumption, such that
ΓHjt = λ
E
ntL
HP
jt , ∀n ∈ IN, j ∈ IHPn , t ∈ T , (3)
where λEnt represents the electricity price at node n ∈ IN
of the network where the heat pump j ∈ IHPn is located.
Similarly, as CHPs simultaneously produce heat and electricity
from fossil fuels, their variable production cost Γjt can be
represented by a linear function of their fuel consumption,
such that
Γjt = Cj
(
ρEjPjt + ρ
H
jQjt
)
, ∀j ∈ ICHP, t ∈ T . (4)
Due to the strong linkage between the heat and electricity out-
puts of CHPs, the cost allocation between heat and electricity
production is not straightforward. A commonly used approach
defines the heat production cost of CHPs j ∈ ICHPn located at
node n as their total production cost minus revenues from
electricity sales [3], [13], such that
ΓHjt = Cj
(
ρEjPjt + ρ
H
jQjt
)− λEntPjt
, ∀n ∈ IN, j ∈ ICHPn , t ∈ T .
(5)
B. Interdependencies in the current market environment
In Nordic countries, such as Denmark, heat and electricity
systems are operated by competitive auction-based markets,
such as day-ahead markets, which interface the physical and
economic aspects of each system. These energy markets
operate on the principles of energy exchanges, in which
market participants submit bids, which implicitly embed their
techno-economic characteristics. These bids are dispatched
by the market operator based on a merit-order and least-
cost principle. Additionally, market participants may choose
to offer a certain quantity at any price, which will be dis-
patched regardless of the equilibrium price in the market.
Contrary to energy markets operating on the principles of
energy pools, such as North American electricity markets,
European markets do not explicitly account for the complex
techno-economic characteristics of the market participants and
the networks [19]. Furthermore, despite the aforementioned
techno-economic interdependencies between heat and electric-
ity systems, their respective markets are cleared sequentially
and independently.
The day-ahead heat market is traditionally cleared prior
to the day-ahead electricity market. Given its commitment
status, each heat market participant j ∈ IH submits bids
b ∈ BH for each hour t ∈ T of the following day, in
the form of independent price-quantity pairs (αHjbt, s
H
jbt) [20].
The independent heat market operator clears the day-ahead
heat market by minimizing the cost of dispatching these bids
subject to transmission network and nodal balance constraints.
The dynamics and varying time delays of heat transfer in
pipelines can be modeled using a convex relaxation approach,
as proposed in [11]. However, in practice, time delays in
pipelines and UC variables are fixed and the heat market
operator solves an optimal heat flow problem.
Furthermore, these bids must reflect the marginal heat pro-
duction cost Γ˙Hjt of CHPs and heat pumps. Due to the linkage
between their heat and electricity outputs and costs, CHPs and
heat pumps must anticipate their day-ahead electricity dispatch
Pjt and electricity prices λEnt in order to accurately compute
their marginal heat production cost. As the heat-to-power ratio
of heat pumps is considered fixed and given by their COP, the
marginal heat production cost of heat pumps is proportional
to the foreseen electricity prices. Additionally, as the heat-to-
power ratio of CHPs is variable, their marginal heat production
cost must be computed at the optimal heat-to-power ratio given
the heat production and expected electricity prices. Therefore,
for low electricity prices the marginal heat production cost of
CHPs represents the incremental heat production cost at the
minimum heat-to-power ratio, and for high electricity prices
it represents the opportunity loss of producing an extra unit of
heat at the maximum heat-to-power ratio. The formulation of
these marginal heat production costs is provided in the online
appendix [17]. This cost allocation method allows CHPs and
heat pumps to implicitly model the linkage between their heat
and electricity outputs and costs. However, the heat market
clearing is myopic to the impact of the heat dispatch of CHPs
and heat pumps on the electricity market clearing, and in
turn, to the impact of electricity prices on the marginal heat
production cost and profitability of CHPs and heat pumps [8].
Once their heat dispatch for each hour of the following
day is fixed, CHPs and heat pumps can participate in the
day-ahead electricity market [21]. Each electricity market
participant j ∈ IE places independent price-quantity bids
b˜ ∈ BE for each hour of the following day, in the form
(αE
jb˜t
, sE
jb˜t
). The electricity market operator clears the day-
ahead electricity market by minimizing the cost of dispatching
these bids subject to transmission network and nodal balance
constraints. Assuming a standard linearized DC power flow
representation of the network, this market clearing can be
modeled as a linear program (LP).
However, due to the strong linkage between their heat and
electricity outputs and costs, the bids of CHPs and heat pumps
in the electricity market are determined by their day-ahead heat
dispatch Qjt, and last selected bid b in the heat market. Indeed,
Figure 1: Trilevel electricity-aware heat unit commitment
model
the minimum and maximum electricity production of CHPs,
and the inflexible electricity consumption of heat pumps, are
functions of their heat dispatch. Therefore, as CHPs and heat
pumps are required to produce their heat dispatched, they
must self-commit their minimum electricity production, and
inflexible electricity consumption in the electricity market. In
addition, the quantity bids of CHPs must be adjusted to be
within their electricity production bounds, and therefore, are
functions of the day-ahead heat dispatch and last selected bid,
as detailed in the online appendix [17]. However, this heat-
driven dispatch limits the flexibility of CHPs and heat pumps
in the electricity market [7].
III. HEAT UNIT COMMITMENT MODEL FOR IMPROVED
COORDINATION OF HEAT AND ELECTRICITY SYSTEMS
A. Electricity-awareness through bid-validity constraints
As discussed in Section II-B, the current sequential heat
and electricity market clearings do not exploit the interde-
pendencies between the energy systems. As a result, the heat
market clearing does not take advantage of the flexibility in
the district heating network and is myopic to the impact of
the heat dispatch on the power system. In this context, the
UC decisions and time delays in the district heating network
may have a strong impact on the efficient operation of both
heat and electricity systems, and the profitability of CHPs and
heat pumps at the interface between them. In order to address
these challenges, we propose an electricity-aware heat UC
model which (i) provides an accurate representation of the
techno-economic characteristics of the units at the interface
between heat and electricity systems, such as CHPs and heat
pumps, and the flexibility in the district heating network, and
(ii) induces a soft coordination between heat and electricity
systems while respecting the order of their market clearings,
as illustrated in Figure 1.
.
In practice, the techno-economic characteristics of CHPs
and heat pumps, which interface heat and electricity markets,
can be accounted for by bid-validity constraints. These con-
straints guarantee that the price of the last selected bid of each
CHP and heat pump is lower than or equal to its marginal cost(
αHjbt −Mj
)
(ujbt + ujb+1t) ≥ Γ˙Hj −Mj
, ∀j ∈ ICHP ∪ IHP, t ∈ T , b ∈ BH, (6)
where Mj is an upper bound on the marginal heat production
costs of CHPs and heat pumps, and ujbt ∈ {0, 1} are the
commitment decisions on the bids submitted by CHPs and
heat pumps, such that ujbt = 1 if and only if bid b is selected.
As the marginal heat production costs of CHPs and heat pumps
can be expressed as linear functions of electricity LMPs, (6)
represents linear a set of constraints, which link commitment
decisions and electricity LMPs. These constraints can also be
interpreted as a market mechanism for the coordination of heat
and electricity systems, which allows CHPs and heat pumps
to offer heat bids which are conditional on the electricity
LMPs. Indeed, in this approach each heat bid is associated
with a condition on the electricity LMPs for which it is
considered valid. Therefore, this bid-validity approach allows
greater flexibility for CHPs and heat pumps to model their
techno-economic characteristics and the linkage between their
heat and electricity outputs and costs in the current sequential
market design.
Furthermore, through these bid validity constraints, the heat
UC problem anticipates the impact of the commitment of
CHPs and heat pumps on both heat and electricity market
clearings. Therefore, this problem represents a Stackelberg
game, in which the leader, i.e. the heat UC, tries to optimize
its decisions, while anticipating the reaction of the followers,
i.e., the sequential heat and electricity market clearings. In
a Stackelberg game, the actions of the leader constrain the
reaction of the follower, and, in return, the reaction of the
follower impacts the objective of the leader. In this case,
the commitment decisions of heat producers impact heat and
electricity market clearings. In return, the heat dispatch of
CHPs and heat pumps impacts the heat system operating
cost in the heat UC problem. Additionally, electricity LMPs
impact the marginal heat production costs and profitability
of CHPs and heat pumps. This is accounted for in the
heat UC problem in the form of bid-validity constraints.
Assuming perfect information on the input data in heat and
electricity market clearings, this problem can be modeled as
a hierarchical optimization problem, where the upper-level
problem, which represents the heat UC problem, is constrained
by the sequential heat and electricity market-clearing prob-
lems. Due to the sequential order of their clearing and the
techno-economic interdependencies between them, the heat
and electricity market clearings are themselves modeled as
a bilevel optimization problem. As a result, the proposed heat
unit commitment model is formulated a trilevel optimization
problem.
B. Upper-level problem: Heat unit commitment
In the upper-level problem (7), the proposed electricity-
aware heat UC problem seeks to minimize the heat system
operating cost, while anticipating the impact of its decisions
z on the sequential heat and electricity market clearings.
Additionally, this problem receives feedback on the outcomes
of the heat and electricity market clearings, i.e., heat dispatch
xH and electricity LMPs yE, in order to ensure the validity of
all bids. The set of decision variables z of the heat UC problem
includes the commitment, start-up and shut-down variables,
and start-up costs of each heat producer, and time delays in
the pipelines of the district heating network. Therefore, the
electricity-aware heat UC problem can be expressed as
min
z∈{0,1}N
xH,yE≥0
c0
>
z + cH
>
xH (7a)
s.t. z ∈ ZUC (7b)
AUCz +BUCyE ≥ bUC (7c)
xH,yE ∈ primal and dual sol. of (8), (7d)
where (7a) represents the heat system operating cost, which
includes no-load costs α0jt, start-up costs rjt, and the cost of
dispatching the submitted bids αHjbt, and (7b) represents the
feasible set ZUC of UC and time-delay variables. Furthermore,
the heat UC problem enforces bid-validity constraints (7c), and
receives feedback from the middle- and lower-level problems
(7d), representing the sequential heat and electricity markets.
C. Middle- and lower-level problems: Sequential heat and
electricity market clearings
Despite their sequential and independent clearing, heat and
electricity markets are linked through the participation of
CHPs and heat pumps in both markets. Therefore, when
the electricity market is cleared it is constrained by the
heat dispatched in the heat market. As discussed in [22],
these sequential markets can be modeled as a single-level
equilibrium problem, in which the electricity market clearing
takes as input the optimal solutions of the heat market clearing,
as illustrated in Figure 2(a). This approach would result in a
bilevel formulation of the heat UC problem with two lower-
level problems. However, representing the sequential heat
and electricity market clearings as an equilibrium problem
introduces non-convex bilinear terms in their dual formula-
tion. Alternatively, [22] argues that these sequential market
clearings can be formulated as a bilevel optimization problem,
in which the leader represents the electricity market-clearing
problem, which is constrained by the heat market-clearing
problem, as illustrated in Figure 2(b). Additionally, this bilevel
formulation can be reformulated as an LP, and would allow
us to reformulate the electricity-aware heat UC as an MILP.
However, if the heat market-clearing problem has multiple
optimal solutions, the solution that minimizes the electricity
market clearing is selected. As the heat market is myopic
to the electricity market clearing, this model is not realistic.
Therefore, we propose a third formulation of the sequential
heat and electricity market clearings as a bilevel optimization
problem, in which the middle-level problem represents the heat
market clearing, which is constrained by the electricity market
clearing in the lower level, as illustrated in Figure 2(c). In
this model, the adjusted electricity bids are computed in the
heat market clearing and considered as fixed inputs by the
electricity market clearing in the lower level. Note that, under
the assumption of the unicity of the solutions of the heat and
electricity market clearings, these three models are equivalent.
In case of multiple solutions of the electricity market clearing,
the proposed model selects the solution that minimizes the heat
UC and dispatch cost.
The set of day-ahead heat market variables xH includes the
dispatch of all bids, mass flow rates, temperatures, and pres-
sures in the district heating network, as well as the adjusted
Figure 2: Formulations of the sequential heat and electricity
market clearings – (a) single-level equilibrium, (b) bilevel
problem in [22], and (c) proposed bilevel problem
electricity bids of CHPs and heat pumps. The set of variables
xE of the electricity market-clearing problem includes the
dispatch of all bids, and the voltage angles at each node of the
network. Furthermore, the vector yE represents the variables
of the dual electricity market-clearing problem. In particular,
the dual variables associated with the nodal balance equations
represent the electricity LMPs. This bilevel formulation of
the sequential heat and electricity market clearings can be
expressed in a compact form as follows:
min
xH,yE≥0
cH
>
xH (8a)
s.t. AH (z)xH +BHz ≥ bH (8b)
yE ∈ dual sol. min
xE≥0
cE
>
xE (8c)
s.t. AExE +BExH ≥ bE, (8d)
where (8b) represents linearized district heating network con-
straints and feasibility of the heat bids. Additionally, (8c)-
(8d) represents the electricity market clearing, which seeks
to minimize the electricity dispatch cost (8c), constrained by
linearized DC power flow constraints and feasibility of the
electricity bids (8d). Constraints (8b) and (8d) embed the
interdependencies between the heat UC, heat dispatch and
adjusted electricity bids of CHPs and heat pumps1. As a result,
the proposed electricity-aware heat UC formulated in (7) is a
trilevel optimization problem.
D. Reformulation as a single-level optimization problem
The proposed electricity-aware heat UC problem (7) can
be reformulated as a single-level MILP. The first step is to
reformulate the middle- and lower-level problems as an LP, by
noticing that the objective function (8a) and constraints (8b)
of the middle-level problem do not depend on the lower-level
primal and dual variables, xE and yE. Therefore, the solutions
of the middle-level problem are not affected by the solutions
of the lower-level problem, and the bilevel sequential heat and
electricity market-clearing problem (8) can be solved in two
steps: (i) solve the middle-level problem and obtain the optimal
solutions xˆH , (ii) solve the lower-level problem with xH
fixed to xˆH and obtain the optimal solutions yˆE. Therefore,
the middle- and lower-level problems can be approximated
by a single-level LP using a lexicographic function [14]. The
electricity-aware UC problem can then be reformulated as a
single-level MILP, by strong duality of this approximation of
the middle- and lower-level problems.
1The notation AH (z) represents a matrix which coefficients aHkl (z) are
linear expressions of the upper-level variables z.
Proposition 1. The trilevel optimization problem (7) can
be asymptotically approximated by the following single-level
problem:
min
z∈{0,1}N,xH≥0
xE≥0,yH,yE
γc0
>
z + γcH
>
xH + (1− γ) cE>xE (9a)
s.t. z ∈ ZUC (9b)
AUCz +
1
(1− γ)B
UCyE ≥ bUC (9c)
AH (z)xH +BHz ≥ bH (9d)
AExE +BExH ≥ bE (9e)
yH
>
AH (z) + yE
>
BE ≤ γcH> (9f)
yE
>
AE ≤ (1− γ) cE> (9g)
yH
> (
bH −BHz) + yE>bE
≥ γcH>xH + (1− γ) cE>xE. (9h)
When the penalty factor γ tends to 1, the solutions of (9)
converge to the solutions of (7).
The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in the online ap-
pendix [17]. Note that the bilinear terms in (9d), (9g), and
(9h) can be linearized using an exact McCormick relaxation
[23].
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Case study setup
We compare the proposed electricity-aware heat UC model
to a traditional decoupled heat UC model, which seeks to
minimize the heat UC and dispatch cost (7a), constrained by
UC and time delays constraints (7b), as well as linearized
district heating network constraints and feasibility of the heat
bids (8b). Contrary to the proposed electricity-aware heat UC
model, this decoupled UC model is myopic to the impact of
the commitment of CHPs and heat pumps on the electricity
market, and in turn the impact of electricity prices on the
feasibility of heat bids. For simplicity, and in order to compare
both models hour-by-hour, time delays in pipelines are fixed
at zero in the heat UC problem. The impact of varying time
delays is discussed in details in [11].
These two UC models are implemented on a 24-bus power
system, and two isolated 3-node district heating systems
representative of the Danish energy system. The modified
version of the 24-bus IEEE Reliability Test System consists of
twelve thermal power plants, six wind farms, two extraction
CHPs, and two heat pumps. Data for power generation,
costs, transmission, and loads for the 24-bus IEEE Reliability
Test System is derived from [24]. Additionally, spatially and
temporally correlated profiles of wind power generation at six
locations are derived from [25]. Each district heating network
consists of one CHP, one waste incinerator heat-only (HO)
unit, one heat-only peak boiler, and one large-scale heat pump
each. The techno-economic characteristics of these units and
district heating transmission networks, and heat load profiles
are derived from [26], [9], [11], and [27]. Although these
two district heating networks are similar, the main difference
between them, which is expected to lead to different UC and
dispatch, results from their interdependencies to the power
system at different nodes. Indeed, the heat bids and no-load
costs of CHPs and heat pumps are computed using the average
electricity LMPs at the nodes of the power system to which
they are connected [24]. At day-time hours, i.e. between hours
7 to 20, the average LMPs are $5.9/MWh in the first district
heating network, and $11.3/MWh in the second district heating
network. Besides, it is $0/MWh at night-time hours in both
district heating networks. The technical data about heat and
electricity networks, load profiles, wind generation, and price-
quantity bids is provided in the online appendix [17]. Finally,
the penalty factor γ in (9) is fixed to 0.99. A sensitivity
analysis reveals that solutions are stable around this value,
and therefore, are assumed to have converged.
B. Results
As expected, the heat dispatch in both district heating
networks are vastly different, despite their identical techno-
economic characteristics, due to their interdependencies with
the power system, as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Indeed,
the difference in electricity LMPs between the nodes of the
power system to which the district heating networks are
connected result in different bids and merit orders. In the
first district heating network, due to low average electricity
prices at night-time hours, the heat pump HP1 offers at the
lowest prices, followed by CHP1, the waste incinerator HO1,
and the peak heat boiler HO2. Moreover, due to high average
electricity LMPs at day-time hours, CHP1 is cheaper than HP1.
Whereas, in the second district heating network, due to lower
average electricity LMPs, the heat pump HP2 offers at the
lowest prices at each hour of the day, followed by CHP2,
the waste incinerator HO3, and the peak heat boiler HO4.
These merit orders are directly reflected in the heat dispatch of
the decoupled model in Figures 3(a) and 4(a). However, this
myopic heat UC and dispatch results in electricity LMPs which
do not support cost-recovery for CHP1 at night-time hours and
between hours 14 and 15, and for CHP2 at each hour of the
day. Indeed, during these hours their true heat marginal costs,
computed based on the realized electricity LMPs, are higher
than their submitted bids. This results in a financial loss of
$4, 389 for CHP1 and $5, 620 for CHP2. By anticipating the
impact of the commitment and dispatch of these CHPs on the
electricity market clearing and LMPs, the proposed electricity-
aware model rejects the bids of CHP1 and CHP2 during these
hours, and switches heat production to the waste incinerators
HO1 and HO3, as observed in Figures 3(b) and 4(b). This
bid-validity approach provides a better representation of the
techno-economic characteristics of CHPs and heat pumps at
the interface between heat and electricity systems, which
ensures their profitability in the current sequential market
design.
Additionally, this electricity-aware heat dispatch provides
greater operational flexibility to CHPs and heat pumps in the
electricity-market, which results in higher wind utilization. In
particular, the commitment and dispatch of CHP1 and CHP2
at night-time hours, in the decoupled model results in high
wind curtailment, as illustrated in Figure 5. By switching
heat production to the waste incinerators HO1 and HO3, the
Figure 3: Heat dispatch in the first district heating network
with (a) decoupled, and (b) proposed electricity-aware heat
unit commitment models
Figure 4: Heat dispatch in the second district heating network
with (a) decoupled, and (b) proposed electricity-aware heat
unit commitment models
proposed model reduces wind curtailment by 6% over the day.
As a result, the proposed model reduces the operating cost
in the overall energy system by 23% and in the power system
by 23% compared to the decoupled model, as summarized
in Table I. Besides, the electricity-aware heat UC model
rejects heat bids with low prices because they violate bid-
validity constraints, i.e., the submitted bids are lower than the
units’ foreseen marginal heat production costs. Therefore, as
expected, the proposed model achieves a higher heat system
operating cost, which is computed based on the submitted bids,
than the decoupled model.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a novel electricity-aware heat UC model
that improves the coordination between heat and and electricity
systems through bid-validity constraints, while respecting the
current sequential market design. This approach can also be
understood as a market-mechanism for the coordination of heat
and electricity systems, which allows CHPs and heat pumps to
offer heat bids which are conditional on the electricity LMPs.
Additionally, a tractable MILP reformulation of the resulting
trilevel optimization problem is proposed. Finally, the value
of improving the coordination between heat and electricity
systems is illustrated in a case study. This simulation shows
that the proposed model is able to ensure cost recovery for
Figure 5: Wind production and curtailment with (a) decoupled,
and (b) proposed electricity-aware heat unit commitment mod-
els
Table I: Heat, electricity and overall energy systems commitment and
dispatch costs, in 103$, and wind curtailment in the power system, as a %
of the available wind production.
Decoupled Electricity-aware
Overall system cost∗ (103$) 181.6 139.5
Heat system cost (103$) 85.6 103.3
Electricity system cost (103$) 97.4 37.9
Wind curtailment (%) 20.4 14.3
∗ For consistency, the bids of heat pumps are not accounted for in
the heat UC cost, as they are implicitly reflected in the electricity
market-clearing cost.
CHPs and heat pumps in the heat market, while reducing
the operating cost of the overall energy system by 23% and
wind curtailment by 6% compared to a decoupled UC model.
This study opens up various opportunities for future work.
Firstly, the computational burden of the proposed model can be
addressed using a Benders decomposition approach, as intro-
duced in [28]. Secondly, the proposed model assumes perfect
information on the bids of the market participants and wind
availability in the electricity market clearing. However, such
information may not be communicated by the independent
market operator, due to privacy concerns. Therefore, imperfect
information on the parameters of the lower-level problem may
be assumed using a scenario-based stochastic programming
framework, or a robust counterpart of the middle- and lower-
level problems. Finally, a privacy-preserving extension of the
proposed model can be developped, where differential privacy
on the electricity bids is ensured while preserving feasibility
of the market clearing, as discussed in [29].
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